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I. FOUR CASES WHERE LEGAL ADVICE FAILED'
(1) DIVISION WORLD
Three lawyers in one firm were outside tax counsel to Division
World. They would receive work from Division World's inside lawyers
who, in turn, were responding to questions from corporate and divisional
finance departments. "We [outside counsel] would be asked whether a
particular tax code provision has been interpreted in one way or another.
We would research the question and report back to the inside counsel."
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.
1. This article is a revised version of Robert Eli Rosen, The Responsible Organization of
Corporate Legal Services (1984) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California-
Berkeley) (on file with author) [hereinafter Rosen, Responsible Organization]. The research sites
and methods are described therein. Any quoted language relating to any one involved in or with
the cases are taken from my dissertation. Any unattributed quoted language from lawyers or
managers is taken from my dissertation research.
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The inside counsel then would communicate the information to "the cli-
ent," the different finance departments.
Eventually, a securities class action suit was brought against the
company for overstating its financial position. Although any of the
entries in the corporate books arguably could be justified, in sum they
constituted misrepresentation. The company did not survive this suit.
(2) HYPERTECH
Hypertech produces sophisticated electronic products. Its staff of
research engineers is serviced by a prominent outside patent law firm.
These attorneys are available and responsive to Hypertech's engineers.
Whenever an engineer asks for a patent, the law firm processes it.
Hypertech now possesses a ream of patents, of undetermined value. No
inquiry has ever been made for any patent about its desirability to the
company. Hypertech has yet to enforce any of its patents, yet it annually
spends at least one million dollars on this process.
(3) INTERNATIONAL CHEMICALS
An International Chemicals salesman contacted one of the com-
pany's inside counsel to draw up a contract for a sale to Beauty, Inc., a
major manufacturer of personal products. Beauty planned to use the
chemical it was buying in its perfumes. Chemicals previously had sold
the chemical only for use in making steel. The salesman was delighted,
but concerned. He saw a new market opening up, but was worried
because the chemical's medical effects were unknown. He explained
the problem to the inside counsel. The lawyer responded by drawing up
a contract with various disclaimers of warranties (including in respect to
fitness for the proposed use) and with indemnification clauses in the
event of third-party suits against Chemicals. The salesman, satisfied his
company was insured against liability, proceeded not only to deal with
Beauty but also to aggressively market the chemical to the beauty
industry.
After, International Chemicals became a major supplier to the
beauty industry, the chemical's adverse medical consequences were
uncovered. Although largely protected by the indemnification clause,
the company, in response to public pressure, made efforts to compensate
those harmed. The efforts may have been token, but nonetheless they
were costly to International Chemicals. The company also increased its
public relations expenditures, trying to restore its good name. Eventu-
ally, the government intervened and imposed costly regulations on the
chemical's manufacture and distribution.
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(4) GOOD LABS
Good Labs contacted a Washington outside counsel, inquiring
about whether a certain vitamin supplement could be marketed in the
United States. The lawyer researched the law and wrote a memo, cor-
rectly stating that it could be marketed. Through personal contacts, the
outside counsel discovered that the FDA was concerned about the prod-
uct because it was being hailed spuriously as a "wonder drug." He also
reported these concerns.
The lawyer's advice did not surprise Good Lab managers or Board.
An internal dispute, dividing corporate management, about whether to
market the vitamin supplement had motivated the inquiry. One manage-
ment coalition said: "It's probably legal but it's going to be bought as a
'wonder drug' and our company shouldn't be identified with it. Any-
way, the FDA will eventually limit its use." Another coalition argued:
"Let the customers decide. We won't violate any laws, but until they
come into effect, we can make good money."
The vitamin supplement was marketed. The sales exceeded projec-
tions, mostly due to the "wonder drug" gossip. The FDA publicized the
product's lack of proven effect, condemning the companies marketing it
for profiting from a patent medicine. When regulations restricting the
product's sale were enacted, Good Labs withdrew it. The company
never measured the degree to which marketing this product tarnished its
public image. The FDA, however, viewed the marketing of this product
as a sign of Good Labs' mercenary management and began an investiga-
tion of the company's major product to determine whether it was being
over-prescribed. Publicity stemming from that investigation reduced the
sales of what had been the company's major profit center. Good Labs'
profits declined in just the subsequent four months by the amount they
had increased due to the sales of the vitamin supplement.
II. PROBLEM-SET'rING AS A PROBLEM
In one sense, none of these lawyers can be faulted for their work:
The information they provided was accurate. In one sense, they served
their clients: They followed instructions. In one sense, these cases do
not illustrate a failure of legal ethics: When confronted with the conse-
quences to their clients and the public, the involved lawyers replied with
variants of what has been called the lawyer's "kiss-off:" "That's not my
job."2
This article is a second opinion. The above descriptions of these
2. William H. Simon, Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics,
1978 Wis. L. REV. 29, 74 n.100 (1978).
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four cases have the benefit of hindsight. With hindsight, it is easy to
fault these lawyers for failing to properly diagnose their clients' needs.3
This article presents facts about these cases, developed through
research,4 some of which were unknown to the involved lawyers.
Knowing, or assuming, these additional facts, it is easy to accuse these
lawyers of failing to communicate with their clients. It is easy to fault
them for having failed to understand client communications to them.
With a better knowledge of the facts, it is easy for an academic to tell
you that these lawyers failed to listen to their clients. 5
In this second opinion, I do not aim to find fault or make an accusa-
tion. I do criticize actions taken by unnamed lawyers and other organi-
zation actors. On these facts, one could accuse the involved lawyers of
prejudices, biases and distortions in their decision-making processes. 6
But, I choose to emphasize biases and distortions in the organizations
they serve. I speak of organizational, not lawyer, pathologies. For the
reader, those who took these actions are unnamed. For me, they are my
informants. To them, I am most indebted. Let me emphasize, they are
all professionals, doing the best they can in complex situations. They
appear here to teach us about the frailties to which we all are subject.
The aim of this article is to develop cues to alert lawyers to situa-
tions in which they may need to question whether they have heard all
that their clients are communicating to them and rethink their diagno-
ses.7 In so doing, I aim to assist organizational lawyers to exercise
"independent professional judgment," understood as including the
capacities to be responsive to the fuller context in which lawyer-client
communications take place and revision the problems as set for them. I
aim to assist lawyers to be responsive to, not directed by, context.
Re-visionings of the contexts in which lawyers act may differently
answer the question, "What is a lawyer's job?" The lawyer's "kiss-off'
is questioned whenever law jobs are contextualized. Understandings of
the scope of lawyerly concern have consequences in three related inquir-
ies: (1) How are clients served by their lawyers? A manager involved
in one of the cases said, "I want the lawyer to make me feel comfortable
3. The Division World lawyers failed to see the aggregate problem. The Hypertech lawyers
failed to determine what the organization needed. The International Chemicals lawyer failed to
consider the organization's non-contractual liabilities. The Good Labs Washington counsel failed
to understand the organization's dependence on regulators.
4. Rosen, Responsible Organization supra note 1.
5. In how they listened to divisional managers (Division World), engineers (Hypertech),
salesmen (International Chemicals) and the Board (Good Labs), the lawyers failed to hear the
organization's messages.
6. Cf., BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
7. "Diagnosis" is a subject worthy of a Foucault. For one definition, see ANDREW ABBOTT,
THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS 40-44 (1988).
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in my job." He wanted the lawyer to assume responsibility for more than
solving the "legal" problem. Each of the four cases demonstrates the
potential gap between serving clients and solving legal problems for
them; (2) What is the lawyer's social function? A lawyer involved in
one of the above cases concluded: "A lawyer is essentially a nonproduc-
tive drag on society. I have a completely parasitic function." Each of the
four cases speaks to the possibilities of job enhancement programs for
organizational lawyers; and (3) What are the ethics of legal practice? As
one lawyer said, "I don't feel it is part of my job to follow up." In
characterizing these four cases as instances of failed lawyering, I am
assuming that the problems the clients experienced, known to us by
hindsight, are part of a lawyer's job responsibilities. Lawyers have a
duty of loyalty to their clients; at least to the extent that the problems are
predictable, delivering professional services requires, at least, consider-
ing them.8 In this article, I employ organizational theory to reveal
dimensions of these problems that are predictable.
How a job comes to be constituted is what organizational sociolo-
gists call "the problem of job-definition." This problem has special
poignancy for lawyers. A distinctive trait of professionals is their claim
to control their work.9 The lawyer, like any professional, feels that she
should be allowed to define how she goes about accomplishing her
job.'° Like a doctor who ought not be servile in response to a patient
saying, "I'll diagnose myself," a lawyer is not a servant who must take
the task as given to her. Professionals and professions demand a relative
8. David Luban, Alan Strudler & David Wasserstein, Moral Responsibility in the Age of
Bureaucracy, 90 MICH. L. REv. 2348 (1992).
9. "A profession proceeds on the assumption that... the individual does not know what is
good for him. The client... is often ignorant. Authority passes to the professional, who must give
him what he needs, rather than what he wants .... The [professional's] client, unlike the customer,
is not always right." T.H. Marshall, The Recent History of Professionalism in Relation to Social
Structure & Social Policy, in CLASS, CITIZENSHIP, & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: ESSAYS OF T.H.
MARSHALL 164, 158 (1965). The professional's assumption may not be realized in practice. As
E.C. Hughes notes:
"It is characteristic of many occupations that the people in them, although
convinced that they themselves are the best judges, not merely of their own
competence but also of what is best for the people for whom they perform services,
are required in some measure to yield judgment of what is wanted to those amateurs
who receive the services."
E.C. HUGHES, MEN & THEIR WORK 54 (1958).
10. The centrality to professionals of control over problem-setting is demonstrated by George
Miller's study of scientists and engineers. One might have thought that client control over
problem-setting would have been less of a problem for engineers than for scientists. Engineers are
trained to receive problems and solve what is given to them. See MAGALI SARFATrIi LARSON, THE
RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 25-31 (1977). But Miller found that client
control over problem-setting was directly associated with alienation, and in comparable degrees,
for both scientists and engineers. George A. Miller, Professionals in Bureaucracy: Alienation
Among Scientists and Engineers, 32 AM. SOC. REV. 755 (1967).
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autonomy "to classify a problem, to reason about it, and to take action
on it; in more formal terms, to diagnose, to infer, and to treat."" The
lawyer claims the autonomy to set the means by which she pursues her
client's ends. '
2
Work performance can be controlled in various ways. Control may
be exercised through command, through selection of who is to be
employed, through affecting the psychology of those employed, and
through structuring the incentives facing those doing the work. For
example, inside counsel were once thought to be constrained in their
performance of professionally independent work because of their greater
attention to the commands of businessmen, weak professional back-
ground, enhanced loyalty to the corporation and dependence on long-
term employment with the corporation."'
There is, however, another method of control. The task of this
paper is to bring it to the center of discussions of lawyer autonomy.
That method is problem-setting: How problems are set create social
"framing effects."' 4 The effect of problem-setting is to shape decisions.
Problem-setting shapes lawyer diagnoses. Problem-setting may be a
"roundabout" method of control, 15 but it is a primary one.
It is a roundabout method of control because the work it produces
appears to satisfy professional norms. Accepting problems as they have
been set, a lawyer may "prematurely retreat[ ] to technology" and fail to
develop the objectives to be pursued.' 6 Yet, in performing the technical
11. ABBOTT, supra note 7, at 40.
12. Although the client controls the ends ("objectives") of the representation, Model Rule of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.2 and Rule 1.4 requires only that the lawyer consult with the client as
to the means to be employed in the representation. This separation of ends and means is subject to
a number of criticisms. First, it is not clear that the autonomy rights of clients justifies this split.
DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988). Second, it is not clear that a
moral agent ought to accept this split. ARTHUR APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE
MORALITY OF ROLES IN PUBLIC & PROFESSIONAL LIFE 67-69 (1999). Third, justifying legal
practice by lawyers being end-takers fails to produce a legal profession that serves equality,
including access to justice. Richard L. Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced
Capitalism, 32 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 474 (1985). Fourth, the split ignores that means sometimes are
ends. My colleague Tony Alfieri has strenuously advanced this argument. See, e.g., Anthony V.
Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, 81 GEO. L. J. 2567 (1993). In this article, I adopt another
perspective: Characterizing lawyers as ends-takers may fail to protect clients.
13. Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and
Organizational Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479, 486 (1989).
14. This is a very "relaxed" version of how "framing effects" are discussed in behavioral law
and economics. James N. Druckman, Using Credible Advice to Overcome Framing Effects, 17 J.
L. ECON. & ORG. 62, 62 n.1 (2001).
15. ROBERT A. DAHL & CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, & WELFARE:
PLANNING & POLITICO-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS RESOLVED INTO BASIC SOCIAL PROCESSES 110
(1953). See also W.E. MOORE, THE PROFESSION'S ROLES & RULES 88 (1970).
16. PHILIP SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 75
n.9 (1957).
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work, the lawyer doesn't feel that her professionalism has been con-
strained or that her actions are governed by anything but independent
professional norms. She feels autonomous.
Problem-setting is a primary method of control because if what a
lawyer takes as his problem is restricted, his abilities to apply profes-
sional standards of diagnosis, and thereafter make inferences and discuss
treatment options are sharply constrained. 7 To control the lawyer's
work agenda, the topics and program of his research, is to control the
lawyer's abilities to exercise independent professional judgment.' 8 In
the tension between the client's definition of the situation and the pro-
fessional's diagnosis of the problem, professional independence is
exercised.19
The following discussion explores problem-setting in organiza-
tional legal work in three stages. First, I analyze the cases introducing
this paper in terms of recurrent features of organizational life: bureau-
cratic and political pathologies. As these cases demonstrate, legal ser-
vice can exacerbate these pathologies. Second, I consider recurrent
features of corporate legal work: timing and fragmentation.20 Their
presence in the above cases should have alerted the involved lawyers to
the need to consider the presence of these organizational pathologies.
Finally, I consider problem-setting in terms of the legal profession's ide-
ology and ethics. As these cases suggest, to protect their clients, lawyers
must be responsive to the presence of bureaucratic and political patholo-
gies, alert to the timing and fragmentation of their work and reset their
problems when necessary.
III. DIAGNOSIS AND ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS: BUREAUCRATIC AND
POLITICAL PATHOLOGIES
Failures can be great teachers. To explore how lawyer diagnoses
are shaped by problem-setting, I will develop the four cases that intro-
17. One of the principal findings of Heinz and Laumann is that corporate clients control
problem-setting, restricting the lawyer's autonomy. John P. Heinz & Edward 0. Laumann, The
Legal Profession: Client Interests, Professional Roles, & Social Hierarchies, 76 MICH. L. REV.
1111, 1125 (1978). The importance of problem-setting in other professions also has been
recognized. See generally MOORE, supra note 15.
18. See generally Miller, supra note 10.
19. Professional independence, of course, is exercised elsewhere. For example, it is seen in
the tension between the professional's treatment plans and the client's desired results.
20. Timing and fragmentation are not only recurrent features of legal work, but also are
recurrent features in the framing of legal argument. Mark Kelman, Interpretative Construction in
the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591 (1981). While timing and fragmentation
contribute to a form of indeterminacy in law, they also can signal lawyers to better protect and
serve their clients. Cf William H. Simon, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYER
ETHICS 149-56 (1998).
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duced this article. I focus on how organizational problems may shape
the service lawyers tender to their organizational clients. In speaking of
"pathologies," I speak of a client who needs the lawyer's healing arts. If
you object to the drama, think of the pathologies as difficulties in the
organization-lawyer relationship.
A. Bureaucratic Pathologies
The Division World case would seem to be an inappropriate one for
discussing controls on lawyer problem-setting. It deals with tax prac-
tice, a specialty frequently hailed as one in which lawyers have great
autonomy in recasting the problem. In tax, the open secret is that law-
yers shape transaction, even inventing purposes, when they argue that
"clients often need help in thinking out and articulating their own real
objectives."'" Yet, lawyer control in tax practice has a basic norm: min-
imizing client tax liability. Applying this norm at Division World
wreaked havoc. Why?
The outside firm applied the norm of minimizing tax liability to
each discrete inquiry. The different divisions sought and obtained
advice favoring their own balance sheets. In this case, as an involved
lawyer later realized, someone was needed to play a supervisory role,
telling management: "We did this here, but this is happening over there.
And if this is true, you have got problems and you better handle them
now."
The outside counsel didn't assume that role, exercising control over
how the problems were set, for at least two reasons. First, several part-
ners at the firm "represented" Division World. The partner who initially
obtained the representation, who had been a golfing buddy of the com-
pany's starting entrepreneur, had retired and passed the reins to three
lawyers he had trained. These lawyers did not communicate very well
with each other, perhaps because of intra-firm competition or personality
differences. Second, the outside counsel thought Division World's
inside counsel were "purchasing agents"22 for their services: They
thought inside counsel analyzed the problems before they were set and
sent to outside counsel. In fact, the inside counsel merely forwarded to
outside counsel requests from Division World's finance departments.
The financial manager, the inside counsel and the outside attorney
formed a triangle. Each did his own work, as one put it, "without seeing
the bigger problem." Everyone only grasped a piece of the structure.
Each legal problem was seen as a discrete project and the outside coun-
21. Norris Darrell, Conscience and Propriety in Tax Practice, in THE LAWYER IN MODERN
SOciETY 361, 363 (Vern Countryman et al. eds., 2d ed. 1976).
22. Rosen, supra note 13, at 504.
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sel felt, as one explained, "no encouragement or inducement to go that
further step." They relied on the inside counsel, while the inside counsel
relied on them. No one asserted that quality legal service required see-
ing the larger picture. No one performed the necessary coordination and
the company did not survive the securities class action suit.
The outside counsel blamed "the client." They blamed Division
World's inside counsel and managers for failing to explain that they
didn't want the norm of minimizing tax liability to be applied to each of
their transactions, but rather to the entire corporate balance sheet. It was
Division World's responsibility, outside counsel claimed, to set up a
relationship where the lawyers did not exacerbate the tension between
the goals of individual managers and the corporation.
The outside counsel had a point. The transformation in status of
inside counsel, the success of what i have termed "the inside counsel
movement," in part resulted from inside counsel's claims to have supe-
rior ability to provide this service to corporate organizations.23 As the
next case, Hypertech, reveals, some inside counsel take it as part of their
job to assume responsibility for such problems. How Division World's
inside counsel defined their job is part of the problem here.
Outside counsel's total denial of responsibility, however, is too
easy. Legal clients, like the clients of any professional, take cues from
their lawyers to determine how to act as clients.24 Lawyers are obligated
to help their clients obtain the needed professional service.25 Weren't
outside counsel obligated to pursue their law firm's client's objectives?
Didn't these include minimizing tax liability consistent with the corpora-
tion's health?
The Hypertech case reveals another way the disjunction between
the goals of corporate personnel and the goals of the corporation can
affect the usefulness of legal advice. The outside patent attorneys were
satisfied to satisfy the engineers. They did not question the engineers'
goals. They did not ask, "Why should the corporation want this patent?"
Yet, without an answer to that question, the lawyer only can be a hired
gun - a mover of the legal process. 26 He has no strategy except respon-
siveness (to the engineers) to guide his actions, and thus, regardless of
the costs incurred, he cannot assess the utility of his work to the corpo-
rate client. The corporation perforce will find itself both "over-serviced
23. See generally Rosen, supra note 13.
24. PHILIP ELLIOTT, THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS 104 (1972).
25. MODEL RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1, 1.4 (2001).
26. See Robert A. Kagan & Robert Eli Rosen, On the Significance of Large Law Firm
Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 399 (1985).
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and under-serviced. 27
The Hypertech outside counsel blamed the corporation. Hypertech
should have established standards for patent work, they argued.28 Yet,
the company did have standards. The Vice-President of Research and
Development blamed outside counsel for overriding these standards in
processing the claims for their "customers," the engineers:
[Outside counsel] have less reason to be circumspect about the
breadth of the claims they file and the usefulness to the company of
their time and effort. With inside counsel, the corporation is the cli-
ent, not the technical people. As manager of R & D, I don't have the
time to police technical people. When we used outside counsel, I saw
that the filings and the extent of the claims were often not in the best
interest of the company. We needed to intercept that process so we
hired inside counsel. I am not suggesting dishonesty or lack of integ-
rity. Outside counsel were satisfying the customer. But the technical
people don't have the company's long-term perspective. They have a
personal interest in filing a case on which they have been involved.
We try to educate them about commercial considerations, but...
Outside counsel were satisfying the customer. For our patent filings
to serve the company, there can't be a lawyer-client relation. There
has to be a duality of interests between the lawyer and the client.
The Hypertech case involves more than inattentiveness to corporate
goals. Outside counsel undermined hierarchical control within the cor-
poration. They neither understood the effect of their work on intra-cor-
porate processes, nor did they work through these processes: "We need
the lawyer to force the clients to document their work well. The attor-
ney has to rake the bench chemist over the coals and make sure he has
done all the right things. We have instituted forms but the lawyer must
insist that these forms are filled out well. If a sloppy form triggers a
patent process then the clients [the engineers] know they can get atten-
tion quickly."
In forsaking control over problem-setting, the lawyer is assuming
that the problem as set for him is the end-product of organizational deci-
sion-making. In responding to the problem as set, the lawyer is assum-
ing that his work is a datum that will be unproblematically ingested by
corporate decision-makers. Having made these assumptions,
Hypertech's outside counsel misserved their client.
Hypertech ended the lawyer-client relationship described in the
case. They took their patent work from outside counsel and assigned it
27. Morgan L. Fitch, The Role of the Outside Patent Law Firm, in PROCEEDINGS OF
WISCONSIN'S IOTH ANNUAL CORPORATE LAWYERS INSTITUTE, 1964 127, 129 (1965).
28. Fitch analyzes a similar problem in this manner: "Management doesn't know why it is
taking out patents... the Outside Patent Counsel is left floundering..." Id.
[Vol. 56:179
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to the corporate legal department. They turned to inside counsel to
insure that the interests of technical people and the interest of the com-
pany would be conjoined. They also expected that inside counsel would
set the legal problem so that it would be more consistent with corporate
controls. They did not think outside counsel could move beyond the
engineers' expressed interests to perceive the goals of the entire com-
pany. At Division World, outside counsel blamed inside counsel. At
Hypertech, when they lost the business, outside counsel blamed the cli-
ent. The client blamed them.
In both the Division World and Hypertech cases, outside counsel,
as one put it, did not "go that further step." I suggest that the further
step they did not go was to recognize a standard feature of organiza-
tional life: bureaucratic pathologies. Bureaucratic pathologies are dis-
placements of organizational goals.29 Goals are displaced when (1)
instrumental values become terminal values,3" (2) organizational goals
conflict and contradictions are resolved by selective attention to a sub-
set of the goals in particular operations,3 or (3) goals of subunits control
action when they diverge from the goals of the organization as a
whole.32
As the two cases suggest, bureaucratic pathologies are common-
place in corporate legal practice. Lawyers know that managers may
want their "pet project" to go through, no matter what. They know man-
agers might be tempted to favor the instant customer at corporate
expense. They know divisions will often be concerned with their imme-
diate balance sheet and therefore avoid spending money now, even if it
will cost them much more later. They know that satisfying organiza-
tional constituents may not satisfy their obligations to serve the organi-
zation as an entity.33
29. Robert K. Merton, Bureaucratic Structure and Personality, in SOCIAL THEORY AND
SOCIAL STRUCTURE 249 (1968).
30. Id.
31. RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 28, 35-36
(1963).
32. W. Keith Warner & A. Eugene Havens, Goal Displacement and the Intangibility of
Organizational Goals, 12 Ao. Sc. Q. 545 (1968); Charles Perrow, The Analysis of Goals in
Complex Organizations, 26 AM. Soc. REV. 854 (1961); Philip Selznick, An Approach to a Theory
of Bureaucracy, 8 AM. Soc. REV. 49 (1943).
33. Of course, these are not the only reasons for bureaucratic pathologies. Bureaucratic
pathologies also stem from:
"excessive efforts on the part of persons in leadership positions to maintain
aloofness from their subordinates; ritualistic attachments to formal procedures; petty
insistence on the rights of one's status within the organization; insensitivity to the
needs of subordinates or clients; resistance to conflict within an organization; and
resistance to change."
IRA SHARKANSKY, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION; POLICY-MAKING IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 52
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Lawyers, however, may ignore what they know. An obvious indi-
cation of the problem is that lawyers, both inside and outside, will call
corporate sub-units, and the managers employed by them, "my clients,"
even though they know the corporation "as an entity" is the client.34
And lawyers prize having these sub-units and their managers call them
"my lawyer." To meet their obligations to corporate clients, lawyers
will argue that they need not go that further step and inquire as to how
their problems have been set for them: "All I do is give advice. X told
me my client was Charlie. I gave Charlie my advice and he chose to
ignore it. I have discharged my responsibility." As these cases demon-
strate, to protect their clients, lawyers need to understand the organiza-
tional context of their communications from and to those whom they call
their "clients"-corporate employees.
Hypertech's decision to internally hire patent lawyers illustrates the
most common response to bureaucratic pathologies: create a staff func-
tion.35 Corporate legal departments can respond, enhancing their job,
when outside law firms do not respond to their clients' bureaucratic
pathologies. 36 Outside counsel, however, according to the organiza-
tional literature, also are able to detect and respond to bureaucratic
pathologies.37 From an organizational perspective, they are "marginal
men" to the corporation and engage in "boundary spanning," and have
the ability to engage in "communication out of channels."38 Because of
their relation to Hypertech's organization, outside counsel should have
been able to recognize and help the organization respond to bureaucratic
pathologies.
Because of the legal profession's conception of its role, outside
counsel also should have been able to so act. Legal literature has long
recognized that to serve clients, lawyers need to engage in "communica-
tion out of channels."39 To prevent conflicts of interest, lawyers need to
(1972). These too need to be recognized by lawyers, especially as lawyers themselves are subject
to similar excesses.
34. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. E.C. 5-18 (1989). Cf MODEL RULE OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2001).
35. On the use of staff to reduce bureaucratic pathologies, see Harold L. Wilensky,
Intelligence in Industry: The Uses and Abuses of Experts, 388 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. 46, 51-
53 (1970).
36. Rosen, supra note 13.
37. See, e.g., HAROLD L. WILENSKY, ORGANIZATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: KNOWLEDGE & POLICY
IN GOVERNMENT & INDUSTRY 47 (1967).
38. See J. Stacy Adams, Interorganizational Processes and Organization Boundary Activities,
in 2 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 321 (Barry M. Staw & Larry L. Cummings eds.,
1980).
39. One of the great handicaps the American corporation has... lies in the clogging up
of lines of communication. Though communication "through channels" is not the
fetish it is in the military, there is a strong tendency to insist on it, and the result is
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be able to recognize divergences between the objectives of the organiza-
tion and those of its agents.
To aid both inside and outside counsel in being sensitive and
responsive to the presence of bureaucratic pathologies, to help lawyers
live up to the profession's role-conception, in part IV infra, I suggest
cues to alert lawyers to their presence.
B. Political Pathologies
In the International Chemicals and Good Labs cases there was not a
split between management goals and corporate goals, as there was in the
first two cases. In both, corporate goals were not fixed. International
Chemicals and Good Labs are not cases of bureaucratic pathologies.
But, as in the first two cases, because the lawyers failed to analyze the
corporate organization and respond to how their problems were set, they
misserved their clients. These cases reflect lawyer insensitivity to, what
I term, "political pathologies."
At International Chemicals, salesmen are allowed, even
encouraged, to discover new markets. The company grants broad dis-
cretion to its sales force. In sales, in particular, International Chemicals
is a modem, chaotic corporation.4 ° To label it a "bureaucracy," would
be inaccurate. Many managers have the power to mobilize corporate
resources and contribute to defining corporate policies.
The absence of hierarchical checks and balances is part of this flex-
ibility. In particular, the International Chemicals salesman in the case
did not have to convince his line-supervisors that the chemical was not
defective in its proposed use. Initially, the salesman said he "didn't
think the profits on this minor sale justified gearing up the whole pro-
cess [of testing for defects]." After the beauty industry recognized the
chemical's advantages, testing no longer seemed necessary. The sales-
man substituted the test of the market for medical tests.
It is worth emphasizing that no one at International Chemicals
wanted to sell harmful products. The company lacked organizational
an inevitable distortion ... Here is a significant opportunity for real service by the
lawyer. Without any threat to corporate morale, he can cut through the hierarchic
lines of communication...
Lon L. Fuller, The Role of the Lawyer in Labor Relations, 41 A.B.A. J. 342, 344 (1955).
Communication out of channels has been recognized as one of the strengths of inside counsel:
Free and open discussions are possible and usual between the executive personnel
and inside counsel . . . In other words the inside counsel can have a kind of
amalgamating effect between the divisions and units of the company and he can
thus be a very positive influence far beyond his professional job.
Ruder, A Suggestion for Increased Use of Corporate Legal Departments in Modem Corporations,
I Le Juriste d' Enterprise 281 (Comm. Droit et vie des' Affaires 1968).
40. TOM PETERS, THRIVING ON CHAOS: HANDBOOK FOR A MANAGEMENT REVOLUTION (1987).
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systems that combined the desired flexibility at the sales level with ade-
quate safety procedures. Nonetheless, the legal personality, the corpora-
tion, did not have an objective of selling harmful products.
International Chemicals did require the salesman to contact a law-
yer. The lawyer, even after being told of the manager's concerns,
responded with the normal role he assumed in relation to the sales force
- a contract drafter. Unconcerned about International Chemical's orga-
nizational weaknesses, the lawyer accepted the problem as one of pro-
tecting the company through contractual clauses. He saw his role only
as that of being an insurance man.4 This lawyer, in hindsight, can be
criticized for prematurely retreating to technology.42
Unlike International Chemicals; which involves the problematic
exercise of discretion at rather low levels, the Good Labs case deals with
discretion at the top of the company. Unlike International Chemicals,
which second guesses the work of inside counsel, Good Labs second
guesses the work of outside counsel. Like at International Chemicals,
the lawyer in Good Labs prematurely retreated to technology. He saw
his role only as that of being a conduit.43
In asking its Washington counsel to determine whether the vitamin
supplement could be marketed, Good Labs was asking its lawyer to
assist it in choosing its character in the marketplace. The Washington
counsel understood the problem as one of information gathering. He
neither heard nor responded in relation to the divisions within the
company.
The information conveyed, in one sense, was neutral with respect to
the battle within the company. The sides had been formed assuming the
information the lawyer tendered. Yet, the lawyer unwittingly com-
manded one coalition's charge. While the Washington counsel ignored
the divisions within corporate management, he was being drafted. His
authoritative presentation of his findings, which was scrupulously neu-
tral with respect to the ultimate business judgment, was a powerful
weapon in the "let the customers decide" coalition's campaign. The tim-
ing of his report, as well as its concentration on regulatory exposure,
empowered the more "legalistic" coalition.
The battle within management demonstrates that corporations pay
homage to values other than avoiding liability and consumer sover-
eignty. Corporate reputation concerned at least some of the managers.
Why did the company's legal reputation not concern the lawyer?
As he understood the problem that was set for him, the Washington
41. SELZNICK, supra note 16.
42. Kagan & Rosen, supra note 26, at 415-18.
43. Id. at 411-15.
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counsel misunderstood the client's question. This misunderstanding is
understandable, if unfortunately it is also commonplace. Businessmen
want to be professionals, but they also don't want to appear weak. They
sometimes ask their lawyers to translate their moral ideas into legal
norms so that they can say, "The reason for this is supported in the law."
But, to avoid appearing weak, businessmen may ask this only implicitly.
If the lawyer is insensitive to this implicit request, he is doing a disser-
vice to his client. The client is asking for more than information
gathering.
In these last two cases, the lawyer saw the choice of corporate pol-
icy as a "business judgment." He claimed to be only a resource-person.
He emphasized his expertise's neutrality with respect to goals. Yet in
both cases, the expertise helped shape the goals. The lawyers never con-
sidered either the vast discretion the corporation delegated or the inade-
quacies of the corporate organization to incorporate legal information."
Both corporations had decision-making structures whose inadequacies
legal service exacerbated. Not only did the lawyers misunderstand the
question the corporation needed answered, but they also took inadequate
steps to prevent the corporation from misunderstanding the answer they
tendered.
Lawyers confront the problem of inadequate decision-making
structures in other contexts. A litigator, for example, reported:
It often happens in litigation that you can't find out what happened.
No one knows. We kid ourselves that when you take a deposition in
a Japanese organization you can't find anyone who made the decision
because it was made by consensus. But, at times in American com-
panies, you also can't find this out. Decisions grow up like topsy.
Sales are off doing this and others are over there, but all of a sudden
you have a corporate decision.
This litigator also failed to confront the dilemma of corporate dis-
cretion: "I told the client I would quit unless they put in a litigation
support team." The team helped the lawyer process the instant case, but
it did not help the corporation make future decisions. The client contin-
ues to find itself in avoidable litigation.
I call these problems, "political pathologies." They arise because
corporations continuously choose goals and policies. Clients do not
44. Some regulators, unlike some lawyers, as the Good Labs case demonstrates, respond to
the company's organizational weaknesses. According to Bardach and Kagan:
"[I]nspectors ... treat business corporations as monolithic legal entities, with a single will and an
internally consistent attitude toward social and legal responsibilities." EUGENE BARDACH &
ROBERT KAGAN, GOING By THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 81
(1982). Bureaucratic and political pathologies may attract regulator's attention and, consequently,
may be very costly to the company.
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always bring set goals to their lawyers.45 The lawyer may be part of the
corporate goal-creating process.4 6 Where bureaucratic pathologies dis-
place goals, political pathologies distort goal selection.47
Organizations are systems in which goals are dynamic, structures
are multi-functional and power is a shifting resource.48 Instead of defin-
ing an organization only as a bureaucracy, consequently, one must also
define it "as a coalition of interest groups, sharing a common resource
base, paying homage to a common mission, and depending upon a larger
context for its legitimacy and development."49 The organization is both
a bureaucracy and a political body.5 ° Students of organizational behav-
ior, therefore, seek to understand the frailties of not only command, but
also the organization's political system.5
45. See Charles Perrow, The Analysis of Goals in Complex Organizations, 26 AM. Soc. REv.
854 (1961); Philip Selznick, Foundations of a Theory of Organization, 13 AM. Soc. REV. 25
(1948).
46. For the centrality of the staffs political contribution to the organization, see, e.g., DANIEL
KATZ & ROBERT L. KAHN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS (1966).
47. Distinguishing bureaucratic and political pathologies is consistent with Samuel
Huntington's distinction between "executive" and "legislative" processes. Bureaucratic
pathologies plague "executive" processes. (In an executive process: "(l)[T]he participating units
differ in power (i.e., are hierarchically arranged); (2) fundamental goals and values are not at
issue; and (3) the range of possible choice is limited.") Political pathologies plague "legislative"
processes. (In a legislative process: "(1) [T]he units participating in the process are relatively
equal in power (and consequently must bargain with each other); (2) important disagreements
exist concerning the goals of policy; and (3) there are many possible alternatives.") GRAHAM T.
ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 156 (1971) (quoting
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE COMMON DEFENSE: STRATEGIC PROGRAMS IN NATIONAL POLITICS
146 (1961)). This approach reveals a weakness in Cyert and March's definition of bureaucratic
pathologies as including action in the face of inconsistent goals. They claim that in such a
situation, it is proper to speak of the displacement of goals. See CYERT & MARCH, supra note 31,
at 35-36. In some instances, that may be true, such as when a minor policy displaces a major goal.
But, in some instances, the supposedly inconsistent goals actually indicate that the corporation has
failed to agree on a goal. In such cases, the openness of goals attests to the presence of political
choice, which may or may not be adequately organized.
48. On dynamic goals see CYERT & MARCH, supra note 31, at 34-46; Lawrence B. Mohr, The
Concept of Organizational Goal, 67 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 470 (1973). On multi-functional
structures, see HAROLD KOONTZ & CYRIL J. O'DONELL, MANAGEMENT: A SYSTEMS &
CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS OF MANAGERIAL FUNCTIONS (1976); Ephraim Yuchtman & Stanley E.
Seashore, A System Resource Approach to Managerial Effectiveness, 32 AM. Soc. REV. 891
(1967). On shifting power, see ALLISON, supra note 47; SELZNICK, supra note 16.
49. Robert H. Miles, Introduction, in RESOURCE BOOK IN MACRO-ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAVIOR 1, 5 (Robert H. Miles ed., 1980).
50. [T]he experts who deal with external interests and clienteles on behalf of their
corporate employers. . . must perforce represent their clients within the
corporation. . .The large corporation has moved very far toward a "pluralist
government," representative of many constituencies, without ever really intending
to. That government is not precisely democratic, but neither is it automatic or
monolithic. The experts are heard - and sometimes believed after suitable deflation.
W. E. MOORE, THE CONDUCT OF THE CORPORATION 186 (1975).
51. The literature is reviewed in R. Noll, Government Administrative Behavior: A
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Organizational actions are conditioned by both dependence and
independence. Organizations provide bases for both cooperation and
conflict. Many organizational decisions are best understood as "political
resultants:" "Resultants in the sense that what happens is not chosen as
a solution to a problem but rather results from compromise, conflict and
unequal influence. Political in the sense that the activity from which
decisions and actions emerge is best characterized as bargaining among
regularized channels among individual members."" z
Organizational decisions are subject to all the distortions of politi-
cal behavior. In an organization, responsibility must be divided and
consequent coordination is fragile, subject both to unforeseen demands
on the system and territorial battles between groups. In other words,
organizations may allocate discretion without insuring that its exercise is
accountable. 3 Constitution writing is a precarious task. Consequently,
as the International Chemicals case demonstrates, the organization's
weaknesses are only exacerbated if the lawyer stops his inquiry after
learning that the manager with whom he deals is authorized to make the
decision.
Political systems depend not only on accountability, but also on
leadership. Leadership is a challenge and can be easily subverted. As
Selznick explains, guiding discretion is always problematic: "In exercis-
ing control, leadership has a dual task. It must win the consent of con-
stituent units, in order to maximize voluntary cooperation, and therefore
must permit emergent interest blocks a wide degree of representation.
At the same time, in order to hold the helm, it must see that a balance of
power appropriate to the fulfillment of key commitments will be
maintained."54
Multidisciplinary Survey, in THE CHANGING BUSINESS ROLE IN SOCIETY 97 (George A. Steiner
ed., 1976).
52. ALLISON, supra note 47, at 162 (emphasis in original). For organizations as coalitions of
groups with divergent claims and interests united in a continuous process of bargaining, see
CYERT & MARCH, supra note 31, at 27; FREMART E. KAST & JAMES E. ROSENZWEIG,
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 42 (2d ed. 1974). For the emphasis on
decision processes, as opposed to individual choice, see HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE
BEHAVIOR; A STUDY OF DECISION MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 220-22
(Ist ed. 1947); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, CORPORATE CONTROL & BUSINESS BEHAVIOR AN INQUIRY
INTO THE EFFECTS OF ORGANIZATION FORM ON ENTERPRISE BEHAVIOR, Chap. 3 (1970); MICHEL
CROZIER, THE BUREAUCRATIC PHENOMENON (M. Cozier trans., 1964); J. K. GALBRAITH, THE NEW
INDUSTRIAL STATE Chap. 8 (1967); Paul F. Lazarsfeld & Herbert Menzel, On the Relationship
between Individual and Collective Properties, in A SOCIOLOGICAL READER ON COMPLEX
ORGANIZATIONS 499 (Amitai Etzioni ed., 1969).
53. Robert H. Miles, supra note 49, at 20-21. RUTH P. MARK, PLANNING ON UNCERTAINTY:
DECISION MAKING IN BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION 130 (1971); Harry Cohen,
Bureaucratic Flexibility: Some Comments on Robert Merton's 'Bureaucratic Structure and
Personality,' 21 BR. J. Soc. 390 (1970).
54. SELZNICK, supra note 16, at 63-64. This also implies, as is well known, that corporate
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When leadership is not properly exercised, organizations will have
distorted decisions. They will drift from political battle to political bat-
tle. Individual strivings for power will become the imperative of deci-
sion-making. Decisions will be the result of the sheer play of power,
unconnected to the organization's mission. Political pathologies, not
adaptive flexibility, will result.
To serve the organizational client, the lawyer must understand how
leadership is being exercised within it. A lawyer, like Good Labs Wash-
ington counsel, seeking neutrally to supply information must understand
distortions in the organization's processing of that information. 56 A law-
yer who understands that organizational decisions are political resultants
will consider how his service affects the functioning of the organiza-
tional political system and the control of employee discretion by the
organization's mission.
To so act, the lawyer must be concerned with "the special require-
ments for authority concentrations and distributions within the corporate
structure. ' '5 ' The lawyer must examine not only the corporation's legal
environment, but also the internal environment in which corporate deci-
boards by themselves cannot govern. For a discussion of this fact in relation to implementing
corporate social responsibility, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a
Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct & An Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099
(1977).
55. See SELZNICK, supra note 16, at 25. Of course, this is not a complete list of the causes of
political pathologies. In a political system, mobilization is a problem: Issues may not be on the
agenda; involvement may be unstable; the buck may be passed; or slack may be used as side-
payments to demobilize challenges. In a political system, decision-making is also problematic:
Actors may be obstreperous; they may make non-negotiable demands; demands may escalate, be
stalemated, or be resolved by unjustified mutual adjustment; issues may not meet because of the
conflict of incompatible expertises; or issues may be resolved not on their merits, but because of
rivalries, coalitions, large majorities, or small minorities. Samuel P. Huntington summarizes the
pathologies of political decision-making as: (1) "avoiding controversial issues, delaying decisions
on them, referring them to other bodies for resolution;" (2) "compromise and logrolling, that is,
trading off subordinate interests for major interests;" (3) "expressing policies in vague
generalities, representing the upon assumptions which may or may not be realistic." HUNTINGTON,
supra note 47, at 162-65.
56. Cf. JEFFREY PFEFFER & GERALD R. SALANCIK, THE EXTERNAL CONTROL OF
ORGANIZATIONS: A RESOURCE DEPENDENT PERSPECTIVE (1978). "If organizations are constrained
by their context, it is important to assess how the context becomes known, what important
dimensions of the environment affect organizations, and how organizations may be managed to
avoid making mistakes in attending to the environment." Id. at 88. "[T]he organization responds
to what it perceives and believes about the world ... (which) is largely determined by the existing
organizational and informational structure of the organization." Id. at 89.
57. DAVID VOGEL, LOBBYING THE CORPORATION: CITIZEN CHALLENGES TO BUSINESS
AUTHORITY 5 (1981) (quoting RICHARD EELLS, THE GOVERNMENT OF CORPORATIONS 10-11
(1962)). The Model Rules of Professional Conduct appears to be in accord in requiring the lawyer
to consider "the responsibility in the organization and the apparent motivation of the person
involved." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.13(b) (2001). The Model Rules, however, do not
help the lawyer in making this judgment. Such a judgment requires organizational analysis.
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sions are made. Perforce the lawyer must engage the organization's
decision-making processes. "Mending information nets,,"58 is important,
but will only correct bureaucratic pathologies. To protect the client, the
lawyer also must be able to participate in the mending of intra-corporate
political processes.59
Some have gone so far to argue, as former SEC chairman Harold
Williams put it, that "lawyers along with their more mundane responsi-
bilities must be architects of the accountability process which provides
the corporate structure with the discipline necessary for effective deci-
sionmaking."6 One need not go so far. We can conclude that to pro-
tect their clients lawyers must engage in political analysis and
sometimes political work.61 Good Labs would have been better served
had its Washington counsel analyzed the organization's politics. Inter-
national Chemicals would have been better served had the lawyer mobil-
ized the resources for the corporation to determine whether safety tests
were needed.
Since bureaucratic and political pathologies are endemic in corpo-
rate life, serving the corporation as an entity requires the lawyer to con-
sider the setting of legal problems. In certain circumstances, in the face
of known adverse consequences to the corporation, the lawyer has an
ethical duty to move beyond the initial definition of the problem.6 1
These four cases and organizational analysis demonstrate that this duty
must be expanded if lawyers are to serve their corporate clients. In the
face of endemic bureaucratic and political pathologies, it is at least reck-
less disregard of adverse consequences to the organization for the lawyer
not to analyze the organizational agent's setting of the problem.63 To
58. CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE
BEHAVIOR Chap. 18 (1st ed. 1975).
59. Compare the approach here with LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, SCANDAL AND REFORM:
CONTROLLING POLICE CORRUPTION (1978). See also JAMES D. THOMPSON, ORGANIZATIONS IN
ACTION; SOCIAL SCIENCE BASES OF ADMINISTRATIVE THEORY 128 (1967).
60. Harold Williams, SEC Chairman Remarks on Corporate Lawyer Responsibilities (Aug. 5,
1980), in LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., Aug. 11, 1980 at 23, 25. In another context, he stated the
lawyer "should also be concerned with the process by which the company evaluates" its
environment. Harold Williams, The Role of Inside Counsel in Corporate Accountability (Oct. 4,
1979), in George W. Coombe, Jr. Multinational Codes of Conduct and Corporate Accountability:
New Opportunities for Corporate Counsel, 36 Bus. LAW. 11, 28 (1980).
61. Compare this conclusion about the nature of the lawyer's representative function to
Hanna Pitkin's general conclusion about representation: "Thus the development and improvement
of representative institutions, the cultivation of persons capable of looking after the interests of
others in a responsive manner, are essential if the fine vision that constitutes the idea of
representation is to have any effect on our actual lives." HANNA PrrKiN, THE CONCEPT OF
REPRESENTATION 239 (1967).
62. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.13 (2001); See Rosen, supra note 3, at 536-50.
63. This does not deny that agent definitions of the problem are entitled to presumptive
validity. Accord MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.13 cmt. (2001) ("The Entity as the Client:
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serve the client as an entity, the lawyer must be sensitive to the client's
organization. Otherwise, his service may exacerbate bureaucratic and
political pathologies
Meeting this challenge may appear difficult because it requires law-
yers to engage in organizational analysis, a discipline in which they may
not have been trained. I suspect, however, that training is not a serious
obstacle. Lawyers are "quick readers" and can understand the organiza-
tion of their clients. The challenge is a difficult one to meet largely
because, as the four cases reveal, the problems lawyers face can be set
so that the lawyer is unaware of the pathologies or is not in a position to
deal with them. In the next section, I explain what features of their
problems should both cue lawyers to the organizational dilemmas of
their clients and signal to them to confront how their problems have
been set.
IV. CUES AND THE PROBLEMS IN PROBLEM-SETTING
To understand the setting of legal problems, talking to the involved
actors might seem a logical first step. But, in interviews, the actors
claim they are not involved in problem-setting.
Top management says the lawyer determines his engagement. For
example, a Chief Financial Officer, when asked about his corporation's
production and financial controls over outside counsel, responded, "We
can't do it." When asked, "Why not? You control the work and budgets
of other specialized technical services?" he responded, "We can't. Law-
yers are special." Middle management says someone else has made the
determination. Middle-level managers claim they use lawyers "as we
are organized to use them." Going to a lawyer is simply "part of the
job."
Lawyers say the client is in charge: "We are not asked about struc-
turing our relation with the client.... It is given to us and we have to
deal with it as it is given to us." A senior member of a large firm
explained: "Many general counsel give outside counsel too much of a
narrow charge. You don't get good information that way. That's a prob-
lem for the corporate law department and the corporation, not for the
outside law firm!" To many lawyers, client control over problem-setting
is inherent in the notion of representation: "You are hired by your client
for what they see fit."
The buck passing these interviews describe may account for the
cases introducing this article. No manager, no outside counsel, and even
[T]he decisions [of corporate agents] ordinarily must be accepted by the lawyer even if their utility
or prudence is doubtful."). But, as the next section reveals, there are indicators that contest this
presumption.
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many inside counsel don't appear to want to assume responsibility for
organizing legal service so that it best serves the client. Given the varia-
tions in both the types of services lawyers perform and client organiza-
tions, I cannot give a complete account of the determinants of problem-
setting. Yet, it is possible to notice cues whose presence should alert
lawyers and clients to the need to confront the setting of legal problems.
The cues I emphasize, timing and fragmentation, are features of
organizational life. These cues are ones that lawyers ought to be able to
recognize because in many areas of law lawyers use them to frame argu-
ments.64 In law, timing and fragmentation make a difference. So too do
they in organizational life. Protecting clients requires responding to
these cues.
(A) The Fragmentation of Work
The Division World case best exemplifies the fragmentation of
legal advice. Legal work may become piece-work. A client need not
hire just one lawyer or firm. A client need not ask his attorney to be a
counselor. A client need not make it easy for the attorney to have access
to necessary information. A client may see the occurrence of legal work
as unpredictable, unnecessary and unimportant. A lawyer may handle "a
case" as "a case." A lawyer may view her work as specialized. A law-
yer may see her role as a purely formal one. A lawyer may be hesitant
about expanding her task.
Given such forces at work, it is not uncommon for legal work to
appear to be a fragment, unconnected to the organizational background.
The work appears as a fragment both to the organizational actor, who
sees it as being removed from his purposes, and to the lawyer, who sees
it as a limited call on her time. Legal services may be provided by a
changing cast of characters who provide complex organizations with
increasingly specialized and impersonal technical services, thereby
parsing both the organization and its legal problems.
Because of the fragmentation of legal work, the problem as set for
the lawyer may be more or less co-extensive with the problem it pur-
ports to resolve. Furthermore, the actions lawyers take may be unrelated
to actions taken by managers and other lawyers. As at Division World,
unintended consequences may follow.
What is the lawyer to do? Lawyers cannot and should not demand
to take control of the client's problem. Lawyers are not required to
wrest the problem from others and take the helm. But, lawyers, like
managers, are demanded by their loyalty to the organization to be both
64. See Kelman, supra note 20.
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sensitive to how their work may misserve it and alert to signals that
indicate such a result. The fragmentation of legal work is such a signal.
Lawyers must understand the lessons of fragmentation, develop judg-
ment about what its appearance entails and respond to it, helping the
client receive good service.
One lesson of fragmented legal service is a commonplace: Law-
yers must know the law. Fragmentation challenges lawyers who seek to
provide prudent work. Lawyers must be careful not to mischaracterize
"the facts." Examples could be easily multiplied of the adverse conse-
quences of "that peculiar lawyerly ability to see a legal problem without
seeing to what else it is connected"."
I wish to focus on another lesson of fragmentation: Lawyers must
know organizational dynamics. Providing service to organizations
requires lawyers to consider information and responsibility networks
within the client organization and their own. Obviously, lawyers would
not give the sole copy of their work product to the valet at their client's
office building. Less obvious are other ways in which organizational
dynamics may frustrate the delivery of legal services. When delivering
fragmented legal service, lawyers should be alert to at least four ways in
which their work interacts with organizational dynamics:
(1) FRAGMENTATION AND UNDERMINING
ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROLS
As already explained, at Hypertech, legal services unwittingly
impeded the functioning of corporate hierarchical controls. When a law-
yer receives a fragmented problem, loyalty demands that he consider its
impact on corporate controls.
Hypertech is not a unique case: An inside counsel at Foodstuffs
was contacted because of concern that the company was violating the
antitrust laws by selling a product below cost. What should be included
in costs is a legal question with possible alternative answers. Foodstuffs'
inside counsel called an outside counsel who was put in touch with the
manager in charge of the product. The outside attorney found a way to
defend the manager's position, satisfying the manager who wanted to
push his product.
Inside counsel refused to accept the outside counsel's conclusion.
Although the inside lawyers knew the conclusion was legally defensible,
they felt it did not resolve the pricing decision. Inside counsel knew this
65. This quote is attributed to Harvard Law Professor Thomas Reid Powell. Powell was
described as a legend "Known for his sardonic wit." Robert Jerome Glennon, Theoretical and
Constitutional Issues: Comment: Federalism as a Regional Issue: "Get Out! And Give Us More
Money.", 38 ARz. L. REV. 829, 829-30 (1996).
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decision was one in a series of pricing decisions made by different prod-
uct managers throughout the company. To inside counsel, the problem
was a fragment of a larger problem and its solution involved the estab-
lishment and maintenance of corporate procedures for the determination
of costs. Defending the manager's choice, as outside counsel concluded
was possible, would have undermined corporate controls. To avoid such
a result, the corporate legal department favored a different method for
computing costs.
A conflict ensued between the manager, supported by outside coun-
sel, and the corporate legal department. The manager argued that if he
didn't use the method supported by outside counsel his product would
get killed in the marketplace. Inside counsel admitted that there was
enough slippage in the law to justify the marketer's action. Inside coun-
sel, however, argued that there was a larger problem: Whether the cor-
poration would be run according to "common sense"-not because
common sense was just, but because internal controls required a com-
mon sense response. Inside counsel, who had a less fragmented view of
the problem, recognized its connection to problems in Foodstuffs' deci-
sion-making procedures. I do not know whether the anticipated benefits
from marketing the product at the manager's price outweighed the inci-
dent internal costs to the company. I do know that outside counsel never
weighed the costs.
(2) FRAGMENTATION AND INCREASING COMMUNICATION FAILURES
Although general counsel claim, "a lawyer who is asked to give an
opinion in respect to one aspect of a transaction is entitled to look at
anything and everything he wants to that might possibly bear on that
transaction,"66 this often doesn't happen. The more fragmented his
work, the less the lawyer knows about the information he actually has or
needs to have. As one lawyer put it, "The system is set up to keep really
knowledgeable people from getting together."
Furthermore, when legal work is fragmented, managers may give
lawyers only enough information for the lawyer to do a piecemeal job.
Managers restrict the flow of information out of both ignorance and
insecurity. When it affects the lawyer's diagnosis, restricted information
is in actuality a corporate decision, which is perhaps being made at an
inappropriate level.
Fragmented work also affects a lawyer's ability to verify the infor-
mation he receives: "Many managers paint the rosiest possible picture.
Because I am inside, I can identify such people and deal more carefully
66. Brian D. Forrow, Special Problems of Inside Counsel for Industrial Companies, 33 Bus.
LAW 1453, 1466-67 (1978).
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with them. You know how much credit to give them and can take steps
not to let them push things through. If you were outside, you would give
him an opinion letter with a very limited opinion." When a lawyer
hedges his bets in response to uncertain information, of course, he only
increases the likelihood that his advice will be miscommunicated. Frag-
mentation challenges lawyers to control the information they receive and
communicate.
(3) FRAGMENTATION AND THE FRAGMENTATION OF RESPONSIBILITY
The fragmentation of legal work is based on the assumption that
responsibility may be divided unproblematically: There are legal ques-
tions and there are other types of questions. In certain cases, however,
responsibility is difficult to divide.
Consider what happens when a union files for arbitration of a griev-
ance. The plant manager asks the lawyer whether he acted "properly."
The lawyer has the labor-management contract and the facts. He can
answer that, under the contract, the action was legally proper. But can
he assess the effects on employee morale, future labor-management con-
tracts, or even the possibility of a strike? Can he then in any but the
most limited sense determine whether the manager's action was
"proper"?67
The fragmentation of legal work also may affect how clients exer-
cise responsibility over it: "During litigation, I have a great deal of con-
tact with the responsible managers. But, there is another level of
decision-making. You talk to those involved, not the VP's who can
make the decision about settlement. You don't talk to the VP's with the
frequency you talk to middle-level managers." Consequently, this
outside counsel admits he "all too often processes the case," instead of
having the client responsibly control it.
Fragmentation also limits the lawyer's ability to determine if the
manager is acting responsibly. It contributes to the lawyer's inability to
distinguish between the goals of the manager with whom he has contact
and the goals of the corporation. The lawyer doesn't, for example, know
"if the managers are cutting each other's throats" in the marketplace.
The lawyer can act only as an advocate for a position. He 'cannot be a
clearinghouse for relevant information. Consequently, when fragmenta-
tion exists, it is particularly important that the lawyer try to insure that
the choice of which risks to take is being made at appropriate levels
within the organization. As an inside counsel prescribed: "You make
sure his supervisor knows the risks. You write letters saying, 'You need
67. See Maddock, The Challenge to House Counsel, in CORPORATE LAW: 1958, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE 4TH ANNUAL HOUSE COUNSEL INSTITUTE 1, 4 (1959).
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to get these people to sign off on this."' Fragmentation challenges law-
yers to consider the fragmentation of responsibility and its relevance for
the legal advice they offer.
(4) FRAGMENTATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTIVITY
Fragmentation decreases a lawyer's ability to recognize and correct
deficiencies in corporate learning processes.68 When a lawyer "deals
with a case as a case," he is unlikely to concern himself with the repli-
cability of cases:
I don't feel it is part of my job to follow up. That's management's
decision. I don't feel it is necessary to tell them that if they have had
a thousand lawsuits it's necessary to change the product on my thou-
sand and one. Supposedly someone has thought about that. They
know the costs and have decided not to change.
This assumes a great deal of the client. It doesn't recognize that
information might get lost. It doesn't recognize that decisions might not
be made. Furthermore, fragmentation decreases lawyers' abilities both
to detect when this assumption is misplaced and to respond by cor-
recting deficiencies in corporate learning processes: "The tendency of
litigation is to focus on each problem and not raise a problem which
occurred five years previously."
When her work is less fragmented, the lawyer can use the informa-
tion she receives, as an inside counsel noted, to "see applications in
other areas; I can see trends and fix them." In fact, one of inside coun-
sel's supposed advantages is their ability to gather information and
improve corporate learning processes: "[T]he accumulation of cases (by
lawyers) concerning the activity of an operating unit can show that the
management of this unit is not acting with the legal precaution that must
be demanded of all operating units in a large company."69
Even when lawyers do offer advice about trends and repetitions of
problems, because of fragmentation, they tend to inform only the
involved manager. Such advice is likely to be ineffective unless there is
a meshing of the company's long-term interests and the short-term inter-
ests of the manager. When a manager is asked to do something he
wouldn't do naturally, the lawyer must go outside the bailiwick he and
the manager occupy.70
In response to fragmentation, the lawyer must consider the organi-
68. For a discussion of corporate learning processes, see CYERT & MARCH, supra note 3 1, at
123-25.
69. WALTER KOLVENBACH, THE COMPANY LEGAL DEPARTMENT: ITS ROLE, FUNCTION AND
ORGANIZATION 34 (1979).
70. Even when the lawyer influences the manager to make changes, the lawyer's advice may
be insufficient from the organization's perspective. Even when a department re-orients itself after
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zation's learning processes and their relevance for the advice to be ten-
dered. Consider the issue of whether a corporate client should be
involved in a trade association. Given the potential antitrust liability and
the difficulty of policing trade meetings, there is a tendency to advise the
client to leave the trade association. Several of the outside counsel inter-
viewed took this tack, even though trade association meetings are a use-
ful and legal way for competitors to gather together. An alternate view,
advocated by some outside counsel and all inside counsel interviewed,
was to educate clients so they would be able to avoid getting into
problems at the meetings. Instead of giving advice on a fragmentary
basis, a bloc solution was found. Corporate learning processes were
developed. This is the "preventive law" solution.
(B) The Timing of Work
Donnell found role ambiguity and role conflict about "how early
counsel should be consulted by the clients."'" Lawyers can be consulted
before a problem has emerged, while it is emerging, or after it has
emerged.
The timing of lawyer involvement makes a great difference. It
makes a difference for the work the lawyer does ("Corporate attorneys
like to solve problems before they become problems and litigators like
to solve problems after they become problems."), the extent of his work
("When you get called in early, the practice of law is like shadow box-
ing. You have to think of all the potential results. . .It's the difference
between constructing artificial limbs and stopping flowing blood."), and
the success of his work ("Lawyers can be called in too late for them to
do any good.")
In a general discussion of experts in organizations, Merton
examined the effects of when in "the continuum of decision" the expert
is called: "The earlier in the continuum of decision that the bureaucratic
intellectual operates, the greater his potential influence in guiding the
decision... When problems reach the intellectual at... [a] later stage in
the continuum, he comes to think largely in instrumental terms and to
accept the prevailing definitions of objectives."72 How does this general
tendency play itself out in legal representation?
Lawyers often ask clients to call them when they have a legal prob-
lem. Less frequently do they consider the implications of the timing of
when the client heeds this advice. Lawyers should be alert to at least
getting its fingers burnt by legal processes, it may not incorporate this lesson into corporate
learning processes. New routines can be formed without learning the reason for them.
71. JOHN D. DONNELL, THE CORPORATE COUNSEL: A ROLE STUDY 76 (1970).
72. Merton, supra note 29, at 270.
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four ways in which the timing of their work interacts with organizational
dynamics:
(1) TIMING AND THE CIRCUMSCRIPTION OF INFLUENCE
As Merton predicted, the later the lawyer is called, the more cir-
cumscribed is his influence. Although both inside and outside counsel
can be consulted late in a problem's development, outside counsel more
often find their influence is restricted. As an outside counsel related:
"Business people don't call us in early, claiming disorganization, not
enough time, this is what must be done with this customer, and so on.
This gets us into a scrivener routine."73
Conversely, a key boast of inside counsel is that they get involved
early in the decision continuum: "A lawyer in a corporate legal depart-
ment finds himself involved in situations where the legal problems
remain to be defined; it is his job to find if any legal problems do
exist."74 When a lawyer's involvement begins near the start of the deci-
sion continuum, problems are less routine and the work is more broad
ranging. When a lawyer is called in late, loyalty to the client requires
the attorney to consider the process by which his influence has been
circumscribed.
(2) TIMING AND THE REDUCTION OF INFLUENCE INTO POWER
The later in the decision continuum the lawyer gets involved, the
more his influence will depend on exerting power. Power is a costly
method of control. Yet, it may be all that is available to the lawyer late
in the game. For example, if the lawyer is brought in after a commercial
is already in the can he might advise, "You can't say that," but the man-
ager can respond, "Well, we already have. Find us a way so we can use
this thing which we have spent a $100,000 to produce." The manager is
not asking for alternatives. He is telling the lawyer that the costs are
sunk and the lawyer will have to test his power against that fact.
75
When problems have not jelled, the lawyer also need not fight
strong personal positions:
Managers don't want their "big enchilada" to be wrong. If the lawyer
gets in early, it's not a test of wills or ego. By the time things nor-
mally get to outside counsel, resources have been invested, many
departments have been involved, and consultants have been called. If
73. Litigators have a defense mechanism in such situations. They claim that the fun of
litigation is taking a set of facts cast in stone when you arrive and making the best of it.
74. Scott Hand & Effie Gang, The Practice of Law in a Corporation, in PRACTICING LAW IN
NEW YORK CITY l1 I, 112 (John J. Fishman & Anthony S. Kaufmann eds., 1975).
75. Put another way, early in the continuum, you influence decisions. Late in the continuum,
you have to control actions.
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the outside counsel then says that doing it is a violation of something
obscure, the client says, "Change the law or get us another partner
who will say it's fine." At that time, there is a lot of pressure on the
outside counsel to go back and research it and find a few cases in our
favor or at least come up with a grey area opinion letter.
This does not mean that a lawyer who is called in late can't meet
this pressure. It does mean that he must exert power to do it.
The relationship between timing and the lawyer's need to exercise
power has not escaped managerial notice. A typical way clients seek to
evade legal constraint is by casting the decision as an "emergency."
Emergencies are a regular feature of organizational life. Managers, like
lawyers, are always responding to fires that need to be put out immedi-
ately.76 But, emergencies also can be created. The manager may pur-
posefully sit on a problem, passing it to the lawyer only when the lawyer
would have to stop many spinning wheels to halt the process. 77 In emer-
gency situations only immediately realizable costs and benefits are con-
sidered relevant. "If you are brought in late, it goes from being a give
and take to an all or nothing situation." Rather than an equal partner in
the relationship, the lawyer is subservient unless he chooses to exercise
power. "When there is a full court press on to do something and legal is
the hold-up, everyone knows it." To resist conformity, the lawyer must
be willing and able to exert power.78 A lawyer alert to how organiza-
tional dynamics can determine the timing of legal work will examine the
uses being made of the emergency. Late involvement ought to alert the
lawyer that the organization may need to consider why its legal
problems are emergencies.79
(3) TIMING AS AN EXTERNAL SIGNAL
Managers know that when they involve their attorneys they are sig-
naling something to the other side. For the most part, what they are
signaling is either indistinct or too peculiar to the situation to be general-
76. See STANLEY YOUNG, MANAGEMENT: A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 146 (1966).
77. In one sense, emergencies defuse conflicts. In emergencies, the lawyer and manager may
assume they share the same expectations about how the lawyer should perform his service and
what the service entails. In emergencies, the conflict between what is expected and what is
provided appears to be transient: The corporation in this instance lacks sufficient resources to
fulfill these assumptions. Defusing the conflict, emergencies reduce the likelihood that the lawyer
will try to exert power. He may let the manager "get away, this time."
78. Compare this analysis of organizational action to the strategy of totalitarian regimes to
cast all situations as emergencies. See Isaiah Berlin, Does Political Theory Still Exist?, in
PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS & SOCIETY 79 (Peter Laslett & W.G. Runciman eds., 1972).
79. Like the child who will keep on spilling his food until he learns the concept of volume,
the corporation may keep on putting out fires without understanding why the fires ignited. Cf.
SELZNICK supra note 16, at 25.
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izable. When transactions are regular and routine, however, the signal
of lawyer involvement may affect the nature of the relationship.
Consider, for example, the relationship between the corporation and
its regulators. When lawyers are involved early, government regulators
usually don't perceive the corporation as stiff-necked8" and don't adopt
a guards-up and "going it by the book" approach: "If you assume basic
integrity, you can work things out. If not, you get bars raised you can't
cross." Having lawyers involved early in this process is an external sig-
nal of corporate integrity. As a manager noted:
With a new product, the people at the regulatory agencies have a hard
time figuring out what standards to impose. Some are very conscien-
tious and others say, 'Let me see everything so that nothing will
come back to haunt me,' thereby artificially screening out good
things. The solution is to work openly with the agency. The lawyers
are independent and objective voices in this process. They are better
able to communicate with the agency people because they are closer
to them in terms of background attitudes and interests. The lawyers
don't take a sow's ear and turn it into a silk purse. But they can make
it understandable to the regulatory people. They can tell the regula-
tors, 'Sure the people who are making it have self-interest in it, but I
can tell you that you can trust them. I'm on the job.'
A lawyer who does not ignore what is being signaled by the timing
of his involvement will be alert to the responsibilities being imposed on
him.
(4) TIMING AND INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESSES
When a lawyer tackles a case in its early stages, he becomes
involved in planning. At a minimum, a lawyer's involvement in plan-
ning provides the company with more information. It thus creates the
possibility of decisions more in keeping with the law. But only the pos-
sibility. Information is only one aspect of planning. Information also
must be filtered and alternatives selected.
Where lawyers only contribute information to the planning process,
their early involvement may work against corporate legal compliance.
For example, a Good Labs' inside counsel argued that lack of informa-
tion is essential for the lawyer to render an independent judgment:
As an inside counsel, I will understand better than outside counsel
why the client wants to violate the regulations. I will find the extra
amount of wobble. More information gives you more considerations,
more alternatives. Inside counsel can get talked into interpretations
because they know the client's competitors. I can open my drawer
80. Notice how this differs from one-shot transactions. If I bring my lawyer along when I file
a complaint at the department store, they are likely to think I am stiff-necked.
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and see the competitors' products. So I can seek the wobble they use
to make their products and feel justified in so doing. It's information
about our competitors that make me want to play with the law.
In this argument the lawyer's ethical behavior depends on transac-
tion costs. It is a perverse argument for ethical behavior, but a recurrent
one. The argument, however, only applies if information is the only
contribution the lawyer makes to planning. Then, the lawyer may
become merely the source for the wobble. At Good Labs, lawyers only
report information. Although it is a highly politicized corporation, law-
yers are not involved in conflicts between units. Once they make their
report, they opt out of the goal-setting process. Even though they are
"present at the creation," they still "think largely in instrumental terms
and ... accept the prevailing definitions of objectives."'"
Early involvement, however, should signal to lawyers that their
work is neither the end-product of corporate decision-making nor a
datum that will be unproblematically ingested by corporate decision-
makers. Lawyers should be alert to their role in corporate goal-crea-
tion.82 To protect the client, lawyers must be sensitive to how problems
have been set for them, how their work is incorporated into corporate
decision-making and alert to signals that suggest problems in these
regards. The timing of legal work is such a signal. Lawyers must
understand the lessons of timing, develop judgment about what its
appearance entails and respond to it, helping the client receive good
service.
V. PROBLEM-SETrING AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGY AND ETHICS
Like other professionals, lawyers need not accept problems that are
pre-set.83 They can respond to signals the setting of their problems sets
off. They can openly negotiate and bargain about what their work
requires. With non-professional workers, such negotiation is often cov-
ert. At stake for them is merely "convenience and ease on the job." For
the professional, however, "self-respect, reputation, and career are at
stake ... [T]he negotiation takes place from a position of professional
81. Merton, supra note 29, at 270. Inside counsel's limited role at Good Labs is a reason the
Board went outside in the problem at the beginning of this Article. Unfortunately, the outside
counsel acted like the weak inside counsel
82. The relation of timing to intra-corporate political processes is an application to
organizational behavior of a truism of litigation practice. Everyone knows that having a lawyer
involved early can help prevent and settle lawsuits, both by steering the company away from
problems and by defining the client's objectives. In litigation the parties often only see what is
really at stake very far down the road. Although legal rights are frequently tossed back and forth
in the litigation process, they may be tangential to the settlement posture. Compromise and
settlement will not occur until the parties decide what the case is really worth to them.
83. See supra notes 9-12.
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worth and values and involves a whole rhetoric of professional
claims."84
The first level for analyzing the insensitivities attested to by the
cases introducing this article, therefore, must be at the level of profes-
sional values and claims. Why doesn't building a practice mean creating
a relation in which the lawyer can give the client more than the client
immediately wants? How do lawyers with good judgment recast the
problems given to them? What are a lawyer's duties in investigating a
problem? Why are the elite lawyers involved in the cases introducing
this article satisfied with saying "It's not my job"?
In the profession's role-concept, the lawyer's independent judg-
ment does set the problem on which he works: A client in need contacts
a lawyer. The lawyer learns the facts of the case as the client under-
stands them. The lawyer then searches for other facts to diagnose the
true problem. He deposes and interrogates. He filters out distortions,
probing to the heart of the matter. Then, based on his training, the law-
yer diagnoses.85 As the ABA once put it: "One who undertakes the
practice of a profession cannot rest content with the faithful discharge of
duties assigned to him by others."86
Yet in practice, lawyers do not always set the problems on which
they work.87 They may accept client control over the definition of the
problem, the lawyer's access to the facts, and the choice of remedies.88
Or, lawyers may not consider redefining the problem, finding it undesir-
able to invest too much effort on it.89
This gap between ideology and practice is reflected in lawyer self-
consciousness. When corporate lawyers talk about their work, they
oscillate between asserting the transcendental independence of a law-
yer's role, deciding power balances and helping individuals out of deep
84. Rue Bucher & Joan Stelling, Characteristics of Professional Organizations, in
COLLEAGUES IN ORGANIZATION: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF PROFESSIONAL WORK 121, 125
(Ralph L. Blankenship ed., 1977).
85. See, e.g., American Bar Association, Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-1, EC 5-
24 (1969).
86. A.B.A. Joint Conference of Professional Responsibility, Professional Responsibility:
Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1159 (1958).
87. Interestingly, in one study, conducted before the upgrading of corporate legal
departments, see Rosen, supra note 13, no difference was found between inside and outside
counsel with respect to bureaucratic controls on their work. Richard H. Hall, Professionalization
and Bureaucratization, 32 AM. Soc. REV. 92, 103 (1968); Richard H. Hall, Some Organizational
Considerations in the Professional-Organizational Relationship, 12 AD. Sci. Q. 461, 473 (1967).
88. Ignoring their duties to protect their clients, see note 82 supra, lawyers may too readily
accede to clients who say "I pay you for what I want you to do, not what you want to do," or
"When I want you to turn on your meter, I'll tell you."
89. The provision of non-customized legal services was Justice Powell's concern in Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 389-90 (1977).
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trouble, and the mundane servility of their work, greasing corporate
wheels and following the dictates of the market. Lawyers try to repress
this fundamental contradiction by telling war stories and by stressing the
dollar value of the problems they handle. But practicing attorneys know
their situation often is an ironic one. All too often each of them is like
the clown at the circus who, by waving his arms, seeks to convey that he
is the master of the ceremony. There is a defensiveness in the lawyer's
"kiss-off, .... It's not my job." The "kiss-off' attempts to repress the fact
that a lawyer's role is not the same as the work he does.
Roles are not totally defined by how they are played. 9° While it is
true that the actor makes the role, it is also true that the role tests the
actor. 9' Roles include generalized expectations that serve as reference
points for actors' performances. Professionals, whose attitudes, in part,
are formed and maintained by professional schools and organizations,
are keenly aware that they have a role they may not play well. 92
The gap between the profession's role-concept and the ways law-
yers act evidences the fact that a profession is composed of both attitudi-
nal and structural components and these "do not necessarily vary
together." 93 A profession has attitudinal components that affect how a
professional views his own work. A profession instills beliefs and gen-
erates a sense of calling in its practitioners. A profession idolizes exem-
plars to whom individuals compare their work. A profession also has
structural components which affect how a professional works. A profes-
sion sanctions a division of labor and rules governing work. A profes-
sion authorizes controls on its practitioners' work. A profession's
attitudinal and structural components may have different sources and
supports. These components are relatively independent of each other.
The relative independence of the profession's attitudinal and struc-
tural components explains why the legal profession's view of itself vac-
illates between the cynical and the optimistic. 94 The structural
components of the legal profession appear to contradict the profession's
attitudinal components, its role-concept. Others have seized this appar-
90. ROBERT A. DAHL & CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, supra at 15.
91. See TALCOTr PARSONS & EDWARD A. SHILS, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF ACTION 23
(1951).
92. See TALCOrr PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 38-40 (1951).
93. Richard H. Hall, Professionalization and Bureaucratization, 32 AM. Soc. REV. 92, 103
(1968).
94. Simon, supra note 2, at 29; Robert W. Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual in the Law":
Fantasies and Practices of New York City Lawyers 1870-1890, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS:
LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 61 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984); Rayman L. Soloman,
Five Crises or One: The Concept of Legal Professionalism, 1925-1960, in LAWYER'S IDEALS/
LAWYERS PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION (Robert L.
Nelson et. al. eds., 1992).
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ent contradiction, concluding that the role-concept's only function is to
merchandize the lawyer's importance and morality to attain and main-
tain the legal profession's monopoly status.95 This conclusion incor-
rectly assumes that the legal profession is internally static. The apparent
contradiction arises because of the relative independence of the profes-
sion's attitudinal and structural components. But, these components are
not totally independent. They challenge each other.
Admittedly, too often the challenge is blunted. Today the primary
function of the role-concept appears to be to prevent lawyers from
becoming disenchanted with their work by making their structural sub-
servience appear transient.96 But, thus the mandarin is defeated. When
systematic discrepancies with the professional role-concept are taken as
transient exceptions not worth confronting, lawyers tend to conform to
the structural setting of their problems and claims of professional inde-
pendence merit cynical responses. When attitudinal components of the
profession do not challenge its structural components, the lawyer's only
refuge is irony.
The relative independence of the profession's attitudinal and struc-
tural components, however, provides some reason for optimism. The
attitudinal components of the legal profession can be the basis for
change. Expansive role-concepts can challenge current work agenda
and their structural determinants.97 Expansive role-concepts can facili-
tate role-taking.98 The profession's concept of its role can inspire law-
yers to fight externally set agenda and structure their role to allow for
autonomy. 99 Lawyers can be responsive to, not directed by, contexts.
The profession's role-concept, while relatively independent from
the profession's structural components, however, has responded to them.
While the dominant professional image stresses the lawyer's indepen-
dence, there is a counter-image that encapsulates the structural servility
of practice. In this image, lawyers are hired guns or resource-persons
obeying client directions."°
There is a truth in this counter-image. Lawyers are client-serving
professionals who must not dominate their clients. Consequently, the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct stipulates that "[a] lawyer shall
95. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on
Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L. REV. 689 (1981).
96. Cf ELIOT FRIEDSON, PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF MEDICAL
CARE 93-102 (1st ed. 1970).
97. See A.M. CARR-SAUNDERS & P.A. WILSON, THE PROFESSIONS 403-04 (1933); RONALD
M. PAVALKO, SOCIOLOGY OF OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 101 (1971).
98. SELZNICK, supra note 16, at 3.
99. Id. at 121-22.
100. Kagan & Rosen, supra note 26.
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abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representa-
tion,"1 ' and comments that "[t]he client has ultimate authority to deter-
mine the purposes to be served by legal representation."' 2
The norms of professional independence and of client service are in
tension. The counter-image too quickly resolves this tension by retreat-
ing to client dominance. Instead of an expansive role-concept, it
imposes a restrictive one. It fails to recognize that lawyers can be per-
suasive, that they can lead while being led.1"3 It reduces proper respect
for clients into servility.'" The counter-image has led even those con-
cerned with legal ethics to flirt with what the dominant image casts as an
unprofessional stance. For example, an analyst of conflicts of interest in
legal work adopts the following definition of the lawyer's principal duty:
"The lawyer should take that action that is best calculated to advance the
client's interests, as the client defines them.'" 5 Does this analyst mean
that the client, like the customer, is always right? 0 6
The dominant-image resolves the tension between independence
and client service by stressing the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client.
But by characterizing the client as a customer, the counter-image
eschews the dominant image's understanding of the fidelity lawyers owe
to their clients. Loyalty is not obedience. Loyalty to the client may
require the lawyer to transcend the problem as set by the client. Legal
ethics does emphasize client control over choices within a problem.
But, this is not identical to control over the scope of the problem.
0 7
Diagnosis is a professional art. In the language of organizational analy-
sis, the client controls vertical but not necessarily horizontal specializa-
tion. In other words, an ethical lawyer in the dominant-image is
required to exercise some control over problem-setting. The lawyer
tends to the "whole" client, probing problems.0 8
101. MODEL RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2001). Cf, MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1969).
102. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmmt. (2001) ("Scope of Representation").
103. Robert Eli Rosen, Persuasion: The Art of Leading While Being Led, 16(2) Law Practice
Mgmt. (ABA) 30 (1990).
104. ROBERT ELI ROSEN, On the Social Significance of Critical Lawyering, LEGAL ETHICS
(forthcoming) (reviewing CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998)).
105. Note, Developments Conflicts of Interest, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1255 (1981) (emphasis
added). The Note then restricts this duty by the lawyer's duties to the legal system and the public.
Id. at 1260.
106. Contra Marshall, supra note 9.
107. Compare MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-5 (1969) with MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1969).
108. This analysis explains why a lawyer may not represent adverse clients in unrelated
actions. See Fund of Funds, Ltd., v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 232-33 (2d Cir.
1977); Grievance Comm. v. Rottner, 203 A.2d 82, 84 (Conn. 1964). The problems may be
different, but the lawyer's loyalty extends to serving the whole client. Loyalty requires an
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Whatever is the general salience of the counter-image, its perva-
siveness in corporate work is surprising. Corporate lawyers typically
pride themselves on their autonomy. They demand and receive high
fees supposedly because of their independent judgment. Furthermore, to
render professional service in the corporate context, the lawyer cannot
quickly retreat to servility. As the Code of Professional Responsibility
explains: "A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar
entity owes his allegiance to the entity and not to a stockholder, director,
officer, employee, representative, or other person connected with the
entity. In advising the entity, a lawyer should keep paramount its inter-
ests and his professional judgment should not be influenced by the per-
sonal desires of any person or organization."' 9 Because the lawyer's
true client is the corporate entity, the interests and problems as defined
by agents of the corporation need not always be served. The lawyer's
loyalty is to the entity. In organizational work, in a practical sense, the
customer - the organization agent - is not always right. 110 In organi-
zational work, the lawyer ought not be simply an ends-taker.
Part of the reason why today the profession's role-concept fails to
challenge the work lawyers perform is that the profession has failed to
detail the requirements of the duty of loyalty, especially when serving
the "client as an entity."''I This paper has attempted to develop the duty
of loyalty through organizational analysis. There are organizational rea-
sons why the interests of corporate agents may differ from the interests
of the corporation "as an entity:" Bureaucratic and political pathologies
require the lawyer in being loyal to the entity to exert control over the
setting of the problems on which he works.
expansive horizontal conception of the lawyer's work. That the horizontal demands of loyalty can
be waived by client consent does not contradict this interpretation. Such a waiver should occur
only after full discussion of the client's entire legal picture. This discussion is precisely what is
missing when the client sets the problems for the lawyer.
109. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, EC 5-18 (1969). Cf MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT, R. 1.13(a) (2001): "A lawyer employed or retained to represent an organization
represents the organization as distinct from its directors, officers, employees, members,
shareholders or other constituents."
110. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 1.13 cmmt. (2001):
In transactions between an organization and its lawyer . . . the organization can
speak and decide only through agents, such as its officers or employees. In effect,
the client-lawyer relationship is maintained through an intermediary between the
client and the lawyer. This fact requires the lawyer under certain conditions to be
concerned whether the intermediary legitimately represents the client.
11. See GEOFFRY C. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 43-68 (1978); Ronald D.
Rotunda, Law, Lawyers and Managers, in THE ETHICS OF CORPORATE CONDUCT 127 (Clarence
Walton ed., 1977); Carl A. Pierce, The Code of Professional Responsibility in the Corporate
World: An Abdication of Professional Self-Regulation, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 350, 352, 354,
356 (1973); American Bar Association, Committee On Professional Ethics, Formal Opinion 202
(May 25, 1940).
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Instead of an organizational analysis, a consequentialist analysis is
used by the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility to elaborate the
duty of loyalty: "[W]hen the lawyer knows that the organization may be
substantially injured by action of an officer or employee,"" 2 loyalty
requires the lawyer to transcend the customer's definition of corporate
interests and problems. This analysis is incomplete. As the cases intro-
ducing this paper reveal, lawyers can be blinded to the consequences of
their actions. When lawyers do not actively control how problems are
set, they need not confront the adverse consequences of their representa-
tion. Thereby, they may misserve their clients.
Although Parsons and Blau and Scott have shown that professional-
ism and bureaucratization share similar normative orientations," 3 one
similarity these scholars failed to pinpoint is that both professionals and
bureaucrats can be blind to the substantive goals and consequences of
their work. "Bureaucrat" is a pejorative because a bureaucrat simply
follows orders without analyzing them in relation to underlying pur-
poses. As Merton puts it, a characteristic pathology of bureaucracies is
that means displace ends." 4 Similarly, a characteristic pathology of one
set of professional choices is that professionals emphasize their tools
over the actual dimensions of the problems on which they work. Law-
yers can adopt the worst aspects of bureaucrats and choose to blind
themselves to the consequences of their actions. When lawyers say,
"This is what the client gave me to do," they might be denying responsi-
bility for the consequences of problem-setting. As the cases introducing
this paper demonstrate, lawyers thereby may misserve their clients
whose welfare they supposedly serve by rejecting control over problem-
setting.
A restrictive view of lawyer duties with respect to problem-setting
does not only misserve clients. When the SEC tried to make lawyers
responsible for the consequences of their work, one outside counsel
interviewed said the typical response of his colleagues was, "Let's find
out what makes us guardians of the public interest and write it out of our
retainer agreement." Although lawyers also should be faithful to public
interests, this paper has questioned the central rationale for the "kiss-
off," serving client goals.
Another frequently invoked explanation for the limited scope of a
lawyer's problems is that the law itself determines how the problems a
112. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 1.13 cmmt. (2001) (emphasis added).
113. They share orientations to rationality, universality, affective neutrality and achievement.
Talcott Parsons, The Professions and the Social Structure, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLoGICAL THEORY,
(2d ed. 1954); PETER M. BLAU & W. RICHARD ScOurr, FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS: A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH 60 (1962).
114. See Merton, supra note 29.
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lawyer works on are set. This argument, however, depends on a naive
formalism. One seeks a good lawyer precisely because the law doesn't
totally determine the scope of a lawyer's work. 1 5 Yet, elite lawyers at
times profess such a naive formalism. Lawyers work on cases, they say,
but do not generate cases. Lawyers are merely reactive and are not
responsible for the situations leading to legal problems. Lawyers are not
responsible for the context. They merely operate independently within
the context. 16 As the cases introducing this paper reveal, this is some-
times true. But it is not always true. A lawyer can be proactive. Legal
work can generate other legal work. And lawyers and clients may dif-
ferently define the context of legal service.
Lawyers have opportunities and responsibilities for serving their
clients that are not realized when lawyers respond, "This is what my
client gave me to do." By recognizing that problem-setting is a depen-
dent variable affected by choices both the lawyer and client make, we
can move away from a self-serving professional ethic to an ethic of
responsibility." 7 To be loyal to the client "as an entity," lawyers must
be both sensitive and responsive to recurrent problems in serving organi-
zational clients. They must be alert to signals that indicate the need to
confront the setting of their problems." 8
VI. CONCLUSION
Like other workers, lawyers have jobs that are conditioned by occu-
pational, organizational, client and social control systems. 19 In this arti-
cle, I have explored ways in which organization lawyers' jobs are
constituted. By examining problem-setting, I have suggested ways in
which the profession's role-concept can support individual lawyers
being responsive to, not controlled by, their client's organization.
Arguing that lawyers shouldn't take problems as set for them by
their clients might appear ill-timed and naive given current dissatisfac-
tion with the legal profession. One prong of the current critique of the
professions is directed at the professions' claims that they are capable of
115. David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REv. 468 (1990).
116. Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B. U. L. Rev. I (1998).
117. Cf Luban et. al., supra note 8.
118. Cf ABA Joint Conference of Professional Responsibility, Professional Responsibility:
Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1218 (1958): "Whether he considers himself a
conservative or a liberal, the lawyer should do what he can to rescue that discussion [of public
issues] from a world of unreality in which it is assumed that ends can be selected without any
consideration of means." "The practice of his profession brings the lawyer in daily touch with ...
the problem of implementation as it arises in human affairs." Id. at 1217.
119. See PHYLLIS L. STEWART & MAURIEL G. CANTOR, VARIETIES OF WORK EXPERIENCE: THE
SOCIAL CONTROL OF OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS & ROLES (1974).
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formulating client interests. 12  Professionals can create demand.' 2 ' And
corporate control of the legal services they receive is increasing.
22
Yet, I have argued, that reconstructing lawyers' work is necessary
to strengthen, not undermine, the ability of organizations to direct law-
yers to serve the organization's interests. Bureaucratic and political
pathologies are ever-present possibilities in organizational life. The way
legal problems are set often fuel, rather than dampen, such pathologies.
Organizational supervision of the work lawyers do for them is inade-
quate and organizations often inadequately process lawyer reports. As a
result, lawyers are likely to misserve their organizational clients.
The conclusions of this article may seem to expand a lawyer's
duties. If they do, it is important to understand that these additional
duties do not derive from the lawyer's duty to serve the public. To assist
the lawyer in role-taking, I have emphasized client service. Mending
information nets and engaging intra-organizational political processes
are required to serve organizational clients' interests. Many would be
troubled to recognize that lawyers are organizational actors. They
would be troubled especially to recognize that lawyers are political
actors within the organization. But, as we have seen, organizational
analysis reveals that lawyers perforce must perform such roles to be
loyal to their clients.
So understood, for lawyers to be responsible they need not be pater-
nalistic. As any student of organizational behavior knows, the question
is not whether lawyers give corporations goals. The proper question is
what goals do lawyers advance? 123  Serving organizational clients
requires lawyers to confront that question.
120. For the legal profession, see John Leubsdorf, Three Models of Professional Reform, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 1021, 1023, 1027 (1982); Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of
Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702 (1977). For the professions generally, see
Bernard Barber, Control and Responsibility in the Powerful Professions, 93 POL. Sci. Q. 599, 609
(1978); IVAN ILLICH, DISABLING PROFESSIONS (1977).
121. Leubsdorf, supra note 120, at 1027 n.3 (citing Robert G. Evans, Professionals and the
Production Function: Can Competition Policy Improve Efficiency in the Licensed Professions?, in
OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE & REGULATION 225 (Simon Rottenberg ed. 1980)).
122. Rosen, supra note 13 at 503.
123. See generally id. Organization theory requires this perspective. Organization theorists
dwell at length on the mistaken conception of organizational goals embodied in the traditional
notion of professional autonomy. Casting lawyers as only conduits of established corporate goals
is based on a misunderstanding of corporate processes. "It seems to me perfectly obvious that a
description that assumes goals come first and action comes later is frequently radically wrong.
Human choice behavior is at least as much a process for discovering goals as for acting on them."
James G. March, The Technology of Foolishness, in AMBIGUITY AND CHOICE IN ORGANIZATIONS
(James G. March & Johan P. Olsen eds., 1971). Hence, lawyers must follow organizational
theorists and take the position that "[i]nstead of asking, Do organizations have goals? we will ask
the questions, Who sets organizational goals, and How are organizational goals set?" W.
RICHARD SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEMS 264 (1981).
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